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Abstract 
In two previous contributions published in this working paper series, we pointed out the theoretical fragilities of the 
expansionary austerity theory (EAT). In this paper, we develop our critique even further by integrating the above 
theoretical investigation with an econometric model testing for the effectiveness of the mechanisms at the basis of the EAT. 
We consider a sample of developed economies composed by both monetarily sovereign and non-monetarily sovereign 
countries. Our time spell runs from 2007 to 2016 since that we are interested to assess the solidity of the EAT postulates in 
the post-crisis period. Our findings reinforce the validity of our original critique, and are fully consistent with out 
theoretical model. Since 2007, the core mechanisms of the expansionary austerity theory were not at work, to say the least. 
Austerity measures did not provide any expansionary impulse to economic activity since that the “expectation”, “financial” 
and “external” channels were inactive at best, or they acted in the opposite direction with respect to what EAT advocates 
would have suggested. Further, austerity per se did not restore any sense of credibility about public finance solidity on 
financial markets. Rather, it exacerbated financial turbulences and speculation on the market for sovereign bonds. 
Interestingly, austerity measures delivered perverse results precisely in those non-monetarily sovereign countries where 
they were thought to be mostly effective. 
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1. The expansionary austerity theory and its (empirical) critiques: A brief overview 
 
The theory of expansionary austerity (henceforth EAT) is part of a long-standing debate in the 
economic literature on the effectiveness of fiscal policy (at least in relative terms with respect to 
monetary policy). Nonetheless, the EAT as we currently know it emerged at the beginning of the 90s 
when some economists stated that discretionary expansionary fiscal policies might have non-
Keynesian effects, since that they may prove to be ineffective to stimulate economic activity and, at the 
same time, they may put at risk the solidity of public finances and of the whole financial system of the 
economy (see Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990 and 1996; Alesina and Perotti, 1997; Alesina and Ardagna, 
2010 and 2012)1. Symmetrically, those economists also argued that well-conceived fiscal restrictions 
might actually stimulate private consumption and investment expenditures, as well as improve export 
dynamics, so that the overall economic activity might eventually expand rather than contract.  
The supporters of the expansionary austerity stress that well-designed fiscal consolidations must 
take the form of deep, persistent and credible cuts in public expenditures, in particular public transfers 
and public employees’ wages, perhaps followed by reductions in the tax burden on households 
(Alesina and Perotti, 1997). In their view, such a shift in fiscal policy constitutes a “regime change” 
that may immediately foster economic activity through three main mechanisms. First, successful fiscal 
corrections may positively affect the behavior of private economic actors through the so-called 
“expectation channel”. Upfront public spending cuts, it is argued, may induce economic agents to 
elaborate optimistic expectations by anticipating future tax reductions and consequent increases in 
(permanent) income. This, in turn, may incentivize them to immediately raise consumption 
expenditures, giving momentum to current economic activity. Second, tough fiscal corrections that 
prove to be effective in reducing public deficits and public debt stocks can stimulate investments and 
growth by re-establishing bond vigilantes’ trust in public finances’ solvency and prompting a 
significant reduction in interest rates (i.e. the so-called “financial channel”). Last but not least, cuts in 
public wages that help to establish wage moderation on the labor market may give rise to a kind of 
internal devaluation that may eventually improve external competitiveness and foster net exports (let’s 
label it the “external channel”). 
The economic literature that more strongly put forward the expansionary austerity standpoint is 
mainly empirical. It aims at supporting a theoretical and conceptually universal proposition (i.e. well-
designed fiscal retrenchments can lead to quick economic expansions) through the cross-country 
analysis of a sample of relevant expansionary/contractionary fiscal episodes. From a technical point of 
view, the EAT literature generally builds up its empirical tests on the concept of cyclically adjusted 
primary public balances (CAPB henceforth), and takes significant shifts in countries’ CAPBs as signs 
of discretionary expansionary or restrictive fiscal policies (see Alesina and Perotti, 1997; Alesina and 
Ardagna, 2010, 2012).  
Most of the criticisms to the EAT also rely upon an empirical approach. Guajardo et al. (2011), and 
Baker and Rosnick (2014), for instance, stress that the concept of CAPB is not capable to completely 
remove the effects of the economic cycle on the evolution of public finances. Indeed, purely cyclical 
components of public balance that are positively correlated with the economic cycle are misinterpreted 
and wrongly accounted for a discretionary restrictive fiscal policy shocks. As a consequence, the 
positive correlation between apparent fiscal consolidation and economic expansion is easy to emerge, 
but it is the outcome of a biased empirical approach and the econometric misunderstanding of rather 
different economic mechanisms. Guajardo et al. (2011), and Baker and Rosnick (2014) also raise a 
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perhaps more relevant causality issue. Indeed, fiscal variables and economic growth feedback on each 
other. The causality runs both ways: fiscal policy can surely influence economic performances, 
positively or negatively. Economic dynamics, in turn, has clear implications in terms of improving or 
worsening public balances, as well as on the type of fiscal stances governmental authorities follow. 
The results of the CAPB-based literature may thus be misleading simply because they take changes in 
the CAPB as the exogenous explicative variable, whist it is the endogenous one.  
In order to address such estimation problems, Guajardo et al. (2011) suggest an alternative method 
to identify episodes of fiscal adjustment. When this alternative approach is applied, the authors find a 
clearly negative effect of budget cuts and/or tax hikes on current economic activity even “in cases 
where one would most expect fiscal consolidation to raise private domestic demand (Guajardo et al., 
2011, p.29)”. Actually, “even large spending-based fiscal retrenchments are contractionary, as are 
fiscal consolidations occurring in economies with a high perceived sovereign default risk (Guajardo et 
al., 2011, p.29)”.  
The abovementioned findings are obviously consistent with the expanding empirical literature that 
has recently put forward the idea of a cycle-contingent fiscal multiplier, which may be particularly 
large and positive during recessions (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012; Qazizada and 
Stockhammer, 2015). This evidence is radically at odds with the concept of a negative fiscal multiplier 
implicitly advocated by the EAT. 
This paper develops a perhaps more general critical analysis of the EAT with respect to the already 
existing prevalently empirical critique. We first move the focus of our analysis to the theory. At the 
best of our knowledge, only a few works have tried to analytically underline the logical weaknesses of 
the EAT from a heterodox perspective. However, we think these contributions to be unsatisfactory, 
either because they rely upon ad-hoc assumptions or because they describe austerity too roughly and 
superficially, without considering the specific policy measures composing well-designed (supposedly 
expansionary) austerity packages. In this paper we try to fill this gap by presenting a simple model, 
which formalizes the main components of a well-designed austerity package in more details, and also 
takes on board the crucial mechanisms of the expansionary austerity theoretical building (i.e. the 
expectation, financial and external channels). Our theoretical critique relies upon the finding that 
economic expansion is very far from being an automatic and straightforward outcome of fiscal 
retrenchments even when fiscal retrenchments are properly formalized, and the mechanisms through 
which they might boost the economy are taken into account. We show that even in such an 
“expansionary austerity-like theoretical framework”, the expansionary outcomes of austerity policies 
cannot be taken for granted. Therefore, the theoretical fundamentals of the EAT turn out to be 
extremely fragile and state- or institution-contingent, to say the least. For sure, they cannot be taken as 
well-established and universal guidelines for conducting fiscal policy. 
We then return to the empirical evidence. Differently from previous analyses, we do not investigate 
the methodological soundness of the EAT literature. Rather, we directly test for the empirical validity 
of the main mechanisms at the basis of the EAT in a sample of developed countries. We consider both 
monetarily sovereign and non-monetarily sovereign countries (read eurozone economies) in order to 
check for the operativeness of EAT’s mechanisms according to the specific “monetary regime” in 
which both monetary and fiscal policies are implemented. Our findings support the theoretical 
perplexities raised in the first part of the paper. Since 2007, the expectation and external channels seem 
not to have plaid any significant role, or have gone in the opposite direction with respect to what EAT 
supporters would have expected. More importantly, in the context of eurozone countries, fiscal 
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contractions seem to have triggered off a “perverse” financial channel leading to hikes in sovereign 
bonds’ yields and mounting financial distress rather than increasing governments’ credibility and 
optimistic feelings on financial markets. In the case of monetarily sovereign economies, our empirical 
findings confirm that monetary sovereignty itself, and not austerity measures per se, has been the most 
fundamental factor creating a crisis-resilient macroeconomic environment.          
To conclude, we propose a comprehensive theoretical and empirical critique to the highly 
influential assertion by Alberto Alesina (at least for the design of austerity measures in the Eurozone), 
according to which “many even sharp reductions of budget deficits [assuming that fiscal austerity 
effectively contributes to lower budget deficits] have been accompanied and immediately followed by 
sustained growth rather than recessions even in the very short run (Alesina, 2010, p.3)”. 
 
2. A simple short-run model of the expansionary/contractionary effects of fiscal adjustments 
 
Most of the critiques to the EAT focus on the debatable economic concepts (i.e. the CAPB), and the 
related econometric techniques used by EAT supporters to validate their non-Keynesian perspective of 
fiscal policies. To the best of our knowledge, only a few non-mainstream studies have aimed at 
showing the intrinsic theoretical fragility of the EAT. 
Robert Boyer (2012) analyses the specific conjunctures under which, in the past, austerity measures 
might have been expansionary in a few small open economies. In doing this, he stresses that there is 
“no general theoretical reason to guarantee the success of any austerity policy (Boyer, 2012, p.297)”. 
Although detailed, Boyer’s analysis remains on a purely argumentative level. Boyer does not provide 
any formal treatment of his points, and he does not frame his arguments into a model through which 
one can quantitatively define the restrictive assumptions and perhaps implausible circumstances under 
which austerity-led expansions might hypothetically take place. 
Thomas Palley (2010) shows the contractionary short-run effects of debt-capping fiscal rules. Yet, 
these effects are the straightforward in-built results of Palley’s oversimplified closed-economy model, 
which is intrinsically at odds with the EAT theoretical apparatus. In our view, this fact makes Palley’s 
critique rather sterile. In this paper, we try to challenge the EAT from the inside by presenting a more 
general model including some core EAT-like assumptions, and showing the extreme and unrealistic 
conditions under which expansionary austerity might in principle materialize.  
Foresti and Marani (2014) propose a simple short-run model in which fiscal austerity might have 
expansionary outcomes depending on the degree of coordination between monetary and fiscal policy, 
and on the intensity of the accommodative stance taken by monetary policy in presence of fiscal 
retrenchments. In their work, Foresti and Marani (2014) define austerity as a given reduction in public 
deficit. By adopting this simplistic definition, they do not consider the specific policy composition (i.e. 
expenditures cuts versus tax increases) of fiscal retrenchments that, according to EAT supporters, 
might actually render austerity measures expansionary. On top of this, they unduly take the positive 
effect of fiscal corrections on public deficit as granted.  
In this paper, we propose a simple model that tries to formalize the general argumentative analysis 
by Robert Boyer (2012). In doing this, we extend Palley’s model by considering an open-economy 
model, and by avoiding in-built results of austerity measures. With respect to Foresti and Marani 
(2014), our model enters more into the details of the policy measures composing austerity packages. 
We explicitly model the cuts in public transfers and in public employees’ salaries (plus future expected 
reductions in taxes) that EAT supporters advocate as potentially expansionary. Moreover, we also 
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allow for a wider range of outcomes of austerity measures on public deficit. Austerity measures may 
squeeze public deficits in the event they turn out to be effective and have an expansionary impact on 
economic activity. Such a result, however, is by no mean automatic. Austerity measures might 
alternatively lead to counterintuitive results, i.e. a worsening public balance deficit, if they make 
economic recession even deeper. 
In this paper, we primarily aim at developing a theoretical critique of the EAT proposition 
according to which well-designed austerity measures can be conducive to growth even in the very 
short run and even during recessions (see Alberto Alesina, 2010). For this reason, our model has a 
short-run horizon, and focuses on short-run dynamics only, i.e. the effects of restrictive fiscal 
adjustments on economic activity and on public deficit. Accordingly, we assume all stock variables, 
i.e. the home economy capital stock K, the public debt D, and the outstanding amount of private 
sector’s debt towards banks CR, as given. 
In our model, we assume an open demand-driven economy. Perhaps surprisingly, the demand-
driven nature of our economy is not at all at odds with the logic of the EAT. Sure, the advocates of the 
EAT notice that austerity measures can foster economic growth in the medium/long run through some 
supply-side mechanisms2. Yet, much of their emphasis is on the demand-side channels through which 
well-designed fiscal adjustments may boost economic activity by stimulating private consumption, 
investment expenditures and export demand. For instance, in a recent contribution on the validity of 
the EAT, Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi (2015) clearly point out that a decisive aspect of successful 
austerity packages lies in their capacity to stimulate private sector’s investment and consumption 
demand by fostering the private sector’s confidence in the solidity of the domestic macroeconomic 
environment. Even more interestingly, they stress how such a peculiar aspect of (successful) 
expenditure-based fiscal consolidations versus (unsuccessful) tax-based adjustments “cannot be 
explained by (accompanying) supply-side reforms” (Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi 2015, p.37). In a 
way, EAT’s attention for demand-side factors is a direct consequence to its non-Keynesian perspective 
about the effectiveness of fiscal policies, and of its belief in a negative fiscal multiplier. Due to the 
short-run nature of the model presented in this paper, we focus our attention on the operativeness of 
the demand-side channels at the basis of the EAT only.  
In this framework, equations (1) – (8) describe the supply side on the economy. We assume that 
production is carried out through a fixed-coefficient production function, in which α is the average 
labor productivity, and σ is the average productivity of capital. In equation (1), L stands for the total 
available labor force, K for installed capital, and Y* for potential output. In order to make our analysis 
as simple as possible, we assume that bottlenecks on the supply side of the economy could possibly 
emerge due to lack of labor, whilst there is always some amount of idle capital stock (Lavoie, 2015). 
Accordingly, potential output (Y*) effectively reduces to the production level that would be realized 
should labor force (L) be fully employed.  
 
(1) 𝑌∗ = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝛼𝐿, 𝜎𝐾                                                             
 
In our demand-driven economy, current output (Y), the employment level (N), and capacity 
utilization (χ = Y/Y*), i.e. our measure of the output gap, are determined by effective demand. 
Accordingly, equation (2) defines the output/capital ratio as the product between capacity utilization χ, 
and β = Y*/K = σKf/K (i.e. the highest degree of capital utilization achievable when production is at 
full potential, Kf being the amount of “operative” capital out of the available capital stock). 
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(2) ,- = ,,∗ ,∗- = 𝜒𝛽 
 
Equation (3) defines the employment level (N) as a function of the demand-determined level of 
output (Y), whilst equation (4) sets the unemployment rate (u = (L – N)/L = U/L) as a function of 
capacity utilization.   
 
(3) 𝑁 = 𝑌/𝛼 
 
(4) 𝑢 = 3453 = 1 − ,83 = 1 − 𝜒 
 
Equations (5), (6) and (7) define the nominal wage rate w, the domestic price level pH, and the real 
exchange rate q. In equation (6), domestic firms set the domestic price level pH by applying a mark-up 
m on variable unit costs w/α. In equation (5), nominal wages are established through a bargaining 
process between trade unions and firms. We assume the nominal wage w to be positively related to the 
expected price level pe and the degree of labor market protection z, which is in turn a positive function 
of unemployment benefits bu. We also assume current nominal wage rates to be negatively influenced 
by previous period unemployment u-1, since that it would reduce trade unions’ bargaining strength in 
the current round of wage negotiations. 
 
(5) 𝑤 = 𝑝;𝑙 𝛼, 𝑢4=, 𝑧 𝑏@  
 
(6) 𝑝A = (1 +𝑚)E8  
 
(7) 𝑞 = ;GHGI = ;GH8(=JK)GLM(8,@NO,P QR ) 
 
According to equation (8), the value of production is distributed among the total wage bill W and 
aggregate profits Π. 
 
(8) 𝑃𝑌 = 𝑊 +𝛱 = 𝑤𝑁 + 𝛱 
 
Equations (9) – (14) describe the demand side of the economy. Equation (9) gives us the 
equilibrium condition on the goods market and makes explicit all the components of the aggregate 
demand, i.e. domestic consumption C, domestic investments I, public purchases G, and net exports 
NX. 
 
(9) 𝑌 = 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺 + 𝑁𝑋 
 
Equation (10) describes aggregate consumption as a function of wage earners’ and profit earners’ 
saving propensities, sw and sπ respectively. Total consumption depends on disposable income. In the 
case of wage earners, this is defined as the sum of the total wage bill W (= wN), public transfers TrG 
and unemployment benefits buU provided by the domestic social security system. The domestic 
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government levies a tax rate tw on this kind of income. Profit earners’ income is given by the 
difference between total profits Π minus interest payments on the total amount of (past and present) 
loans received from banks, i.e. icrCR. The tax rate levied on net profits is tπ. In this model, the domestic 
bank system gets interests on the outstanding amount of private loans (CR) and public debt D. We 
assume that it does not pay any interest rate on deposits possibly held by households. For the sake of 
simplicity, we also assume that banks save all their realized profits (i.e. the difference between positive 
and negative interests), so that banks’ profits do not play any role in determining aggregate 
consumption. For the sake of simplicity, equation (10b) scales down aggregate consumption for the 
capital stock K. Accordingly, ρ and λ stand for normalized values of public transfers and private debt, 
respectively. 
 
(10) 𝐶 = 1 − 𝑠E 1 − 𝑡E 𝑤𝑁 + 𝑇𝑟^ + 𝑏@𝑈 + 1 − 𝑠` 1 − 𝑡` Π − 𝑖bc𝐶𝑅  or: 
 
(10b) e- = 1 − 𝑠E 1 − 𝑡E 𝜒 f8 𝑤 − 𝑏@ + 𝑏@ f8 + 𝜌 + 1 − 𝑠` 1 − 𝑡` 𝑟 − 𝑖bc𝜆  
 
Equation (11) defines the current growth rate of the capital stock. Taking inspiration from Bhaduri 
and Marglin (1990), we assume (I/K) to be a positive linear function of capacity utilization χ and of the 
profit share r (with a and ν as the corresponding parameters). Domestic investments are also negatively 
affected by the interest rate icr on banks’ loans via parameter h. Keynesian-type animal spirits are 
captured by parameter η. 
 
(11) i- = 𝜂 + 𝑎𝜒 + 𝜐𝑟 − ℎ𝑖bc 
 
Equation (12) gives us public purchases, once again normalized for the capital stock K, as an 
exogenous policy variable γ. 
 
(12) -^ = 𝛾 
 
In equation (13), normalized net exports are a linear positive function of the real exchange rate q, 
whilst they depend negatively on domestic capacity utilization χ. 
 
(13) 5o- = 𝜖q𝑞 − 𝜖r𝜒 
 
Finally, equation (14) introduces a crucial assumption that directly hinges upon the EAT logic. 
Equation (14) assumes that, in an intertemporal time framework and according to, say, a permanent 
income argument, current households’ saving propensity may depend positively on the expected future 
tax rate twe. Current cuts in public expenditures, if sufficiently strong and reliable, may induce 
households to increase current consumption since that they may expect a lower tax burden tomorrow. 
By the same token, we also assume households’ saving propensity to depend negatively on public 
transfers. Indeed, it is reasonable to believe that a permanent cut in public transfers, perhaps due to the 
policy decision of downsizing the provisions of the domestic welfare system, may also induce 
households to save more today in anticipation of lower public transfers tomorrow3.  
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(14) 𝑠E = 𝑓 𝑡E; , 𝑇𝑟^  with 𝜕𝑠E/𝜕𝑡E; > 0; 𝜕𝑠E/𝜕𝑇𝑟^ < 0 
  
Last but not least, equations (15) – (17) formalize the public budget and the financial block of our 
economy, i.e. how the interest rates are determined and how they change. 
Equation (15) defines public balance deficit as the difference between government outlays, i.e. 
government purchases, public transfers, the total amount of unemployment benefits and interest 
payments on public debt idD, and government revenues from taxes on households and firms. Equation 
(15b) normalizes the public balance deficit for the capital stock K, with Δ = D/K.  
 
(15) 𝐵 = 𝐺 + 𝑇𝑟^ + 𝑏@𝑈 + 𝑖y𝐷 − 𝑡E 𝑤𝑁 + 𝑇𝑟^ + 𝑏@𝑈 − 𝑡` Π − 𝑖bc𝐶𝑅 − 𝑡` 𝑖bc𝐶𝑅 + 𝑖y𝐷  or: 
 
(15b) {- = 𝜉 = 𝛾 + 1 − 𝑡E 𝑏@ f8 1 − 𝜒 + 𝜌 + 1 − 𝑡` 𝑖yΔ − 𝑡E𝑤 f8 − 𝑡`𝑟 
 
In equation (16) we assume that banks establish interest rate icr on private loans by applying a mark-
up rate µ on the interest on public bonds id. Indeed, in our model, financial operators, say commercial 
banks, hold two types of assets on their balance sheet. On the one hand, they buy domestic government 
bonds. On the other, they give loans to firms. Government bonds are generally considered “relatively” 
safer assets with respect to private loans. Following Mehrling (2011), government bonds constitute the 
collaterals financial operators use in refinancing operations with the central bank. Also, they can be 
“shifted” on the balance sheet of some other institution quite easily. This is not so for the case of loans 
made to the private sector. Once created, loans to the private sector more likely remain on the balance 
sheet of the originating institutions until maturity (unless shadow banking financial engineering 
transform and securitize them in allegedly riskless assets!), together with the corresponding creditor 
risk. Accordingly, financial institutions may ask for extra remuneration on loans to the private sector 
with respect to yields on government bonds. 
 
(16) 𝑖bc = (1 + 𝜇)𝑖y 
  
In equation (17), we set out the determinants of the interest rate id on public debt: 
  
(17) 𝑖y = 𝜙 {, , 𝛺   with  𝜕𝜙/𝜕({,) > 0 if Ω = 0; 𝜕𝜙/𝜕({,) = 0 if Ω = 1 
 
We first assume that id is a positive function of the current public budget deficit over GDP B/Y = 
b=ξ/βχ, rather than of the debt-to-GDP ratio. We make this assumption due to the short-run nature of 
our model, in which the stock of debt is taken as given. We also do it in order to analyze in more 
details how final retrenchments, the ensuing change in some “sensible” fiscal variables – the fiscal 
deficit in first instance, and the interest rates on bonds (i.e. their measure of riskiness) may interact in 
the context of the implementation of austerity programs4. According to the logic of the EAT, in 
equation (17) we assume that policy-makers can possibly reduce financial operators’ yield claims on 
government bonds by squeezing public deficit or, better, by squeezing it in such a large amount to 
prompting a reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio.  
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Secondly, we assume that the abovementioned link between id and b is fundamentally influenced by 
the degree of monetary sovereignty characterizing the economy. In our model, we capture this point 
through the “institutional” variable Ω. We conceive Ω as a bivariate variable taking value 1 in the case 
of a monetarily sovereign country like the US, or 0 in the case of, say, eurozone Member States that 
issue bonds denominated in a supranational “foreign” currency. In a monetarily sovereign country, 
public bonds are usually taken as risk-free assets, since that they are denominated in the currency 
issued by the domestic central bank, and because the domestic central bank will likely intervene any 
time it likes in order to prevent default risks to emerge. Accordingly, we assume id to be insensitive to 
the evolution of the public deficit (surplus) over GDP. This assumption is underpinned by some recent 
empirical evidence showing that government bonds yields do not respond to economic fundamentals 
such as the solidity of public finances, the growth rate of the economy and surpluses in the current 
account of the Balance of Payments in the context of “stand-alone” (read monetarily sovereign) 
countries (see De Grauwe and Ji, 2013)5. The institutional setting of the eurozone is different. 
Eurozone rules impose national governments to find resources on private financial markets only, and 
forbid the ECB from buying public bonds (at least on the primary market), and directly financing 
national governments. As a consequence, the solidity of eurozone national finances is in the hands of 
financial operators. They would likely “downgrade” eurozone sovereign bonds by the same standard as 
other private corporate bonds issued on financial markets, with the corresponding degree of riskiness 
depending on the (perceived) soundness of public finances. The positive link between id and b will 
likely emerge. 
 
3.1 The short-run macroeconomic effects of public transfers’ cuts 
In our simple model, we can find an explicit expression for the level of capacity utilization χ that 
ensures the equilibrium in the goods market. Analytically, by plugging equations (10.b) – (13) into (9) 
and, then, into (3), and by taking into account equations (16) – (17), we get: 
 
(18) 𝜒 = =4 =4 QRJ J =4 =4 J cJJJq4 =4 =4 J =J  .f4 =4 =4  E4QR 4J         
 
In a very Keynesian fashion, equation (18) states that current capacity utilization is a positive 
function of all demand injections, whilst it depends negatively on those factors that reduce 
investments, consumptions and/or exports.  
Let us now assume that the government implements a restrictive fiscal adjustment such that the 
CAPB decreases by an amount equal to – θ. Moreover, assume that fiscal consolidation mainly the 
form of a cut in public transfers (i.e. dTrG < 0). In terms of our model, if we define the CAPB as 𝑏∗ ==f 𝛾 + 1 − 𝑡E 𝜌 − 𝑡E𝑤 − 𝑡` 𝑟 + 𝑖yΔ , we get: 
   
(19) 𝑑𝑏∗ = −𝜃 = =4f 𝑑𝜌 = =4f- 𝑑𝑇𝑟^ , so that: 𝑑𝑇𝑟^ = − f-(=4) 𝜃 
 
with θ > 0. 
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In our model, such a fiscal adjustment has a direct and simultaneous short-run effect on both current 
capacity utilization χ and the deficit-to-GDP ratio b. Totally differentiating χ and b, and taking into 
account the sign of equation (19), we get a system of 2 simultaneous equations for dχ and db: 
    
(S.1) 
𝑑𝜒 = 4 L =4 QRJ yL 4 QRJ f- 4 =4 f-4 =4 =4 J =J yQf4 =4 =4  E4QR J𝑑𝑏 = −-r 𝜃 − (=4) QR/8r + Qr 𝑑𝜒  
 
with 𝑓L > 0; 𝑓c < 0; 𝜙Q Ω ≥ 0; 𝑑𝑡E; < 0 
 
Equations (20) and (21) below give the solutions dχS and dbS of the system (S.1) reported above. 
What emerges is that there is not any clear-cut outcome of the restrictive fiscal policy we have 
assumed, due to the several conflicting forces possibly being at work simultaneously. The sign of 
equation (20) may be either positive, confirming the expansionary austerity hypothesis, or negative, in 
line with the traditional Keynesian concern about the recessionary effects of fiscal retrenchments. The 
same applies to equation (21). Public transfers’ cuts might help reducing public deficit over GDP or, 
alternatively, they may be counterproductive and lead to an even higher deficit-to-GDP ratio in the 
event they trigger a tough contraction of economic activity. 
  
(20) 𝑑𝜒  = L =4 QRJ yL¡	£	¤ 4 =4 4 QRJ f-N J =4 =4 J =J ¥¡	£	¤f4 =4 =4  E4QR J 4 =4 =4 J =J  (ON) R/ J  
 
 
(21) 𝑑𝑏  = −-r − (=4) QR/8r + Qr 𝑑𝜒  
 
Despite such indeterminacy, a few points are worth stressing: 
1. The expansionary outcome of fiscal adjustment heavily depends on the intensity of partial derivative 𝑓L , and of 𝑑𝑡E; , i.e. the expected reduction (here reported in absolute value) in the tax burden 
levied on households. The higher and the quicker is 𝑑𝑡E; , the more rapidly and robustly private 
consumptions may respond positively to public budget’s cuts. Interestingly, and perhaps 
paradoxically, such positive expectations will hardly materialize in an economy characterized by a 
high public debt stock, i.e. the economic scenario in which, according to EAT supporters, fiscal 
consolidation is primarily needed. Indeed, when public debt D is considerably high and a prolonged 
period of fiscal consolidation is foreseen, people will likely expect future tax reductions to be 
modest and take place much farther ahead (at least with respect to current spending cuts). In a way, 
a high degree of uncertainty may “surround” the extent and the timing of future tax cuts. In such a 
context, the “expectation channel” through which expansionary austerity may work is extremely 
weak at best, and likely more than compensated by the overwhelming contractionary effect of 
current public transfers’ cuts. 
2. Public transfers’ cuts, EAT proponents argue, may also boost growth by reducing public deficit, 
hence interest rate id on public bonds and, indirectly, interest rate icr on banks’ loans to the private 
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sector. Such a reduction in the cost of external financing may in turn spur private investments and 
induce the economy to expand. According to our model, such an effect of fiscal adjustments on 
interest rates can hardly take place in monetarily sovereign economies. Indeed, following equations 
(16) and (17), in the case of monetarily sovereign countries, the “financial market channel” through 
which fiscal consolidation may affect economic dynamics likely disappears (i.e. ϕb=0). 
Accordingly, in equation (20), the allegedly expansionary impact of fiscal consolidation turns out to 
be even weaker at the very best. 
     The “financial” channel might be at work in the case of eurozone countries that issue public bonds 
denominated in a supranational currency, and in which the solidity of public finances and of the 
overall financial system hinges upon financial markets’ sentiments. In such a context, one could be 
persuaded that front-loaded fiscal adjustments might reassure financial markets about the 
sustainability of eurozone countries’ fiscal positions and that, eventually, they might more easily 
entail expansionary effects. This logic might hold true if fiscal adjustment effectively lowers the 
public deficit and the debt-to-GDP ratio. Yet, we are very far from taking such an effect of fiscal 
consolidation as guaranteed. Recent empirical evidence show that it is hard to find a way out from 
public balance disarrays without sustained growth (Ali Abbas et al., 2013), and that fiscal 
multipliers are high and positive when economies are in the midst of a recession or are operating 
below potential (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012; Qazizada and Stockhammer, 2015). If so, too 
severe and premature fiscal retrenchments may actually induce a short-run deterioration in fiscal 
and financial variables, instead of improving them, by jeopardizing growth performances6.  
     Figure 1 graphically portrays such a perverse outcome of restrictive fiscal measures. In the upper 
panel of Figure 1, we report the left-hand-side (LHS) of equation 1 in system (S.1), i.e. a 45-degree 
sloping curve, as well as the right-hand-side (RHS) of equation 1. Note that the RHS curve depends 
on dχ due to the positive feedback economic expansion has on its own dynamics via its effect on the 
evolution of the deficit-to-GDP ratio. Changes in the position of the RHS curve depend on the 
“autonomous” direct effects discretionary budget cuts (i.e. θ) have on economic activity via the 
“expectation” channel and the “financial” channel. Upward shifts of the RHS curve stand for 
austerity measures that are expansionary on the onset. Donward movements of the RHS curve are 
due to an austerity-led initial contraction in economic activity. In the bottom panel of Figure 1 we 
show how the deficit-to-GDP ratio decreases (db < 0) when the economy expands (dχ > 0) – see 
equation 2 in system (S.1). A relatively flat (steep) “db” curve stands for a deficit-to-GDP ratio that 
is relatively insensitive (highly responsive) to changing economic activity. The position of the “db” 
curve in Figure 1 depends on the negative direct effect austerity measures induce on public deficit. 
     Let assume that at the beginning of an austerity program, the “expectation” channel is weak, and/or 
interest rates do not respond enough intensively to the announcement of public budget cuts. In such 
a context, fiscal austerity likely reduces the economic activity and makes dχ negative (see 
downward movement of the RHS curve in the upper part of Figure 1). Fiscal austerity may initially 
reduce the fiscal deficit (see the initial leftward movement of the “db” curve, and the move from 
equilibrium point A to point B, in bottom part of Figure 1). Yet, it may subsequently turn out to be 
self-defeating and frustrate government’s efforts to stabilize fiscal variables due to the above 
recessionary effects (see movement from point B to equilibrium C in Figure 1). Austerity-led 
recession may eventually widen fiscal disarrays rather then reducing them, and create further 
tensions on financial markets. 
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[Figure 1 here] 
 
     Things may get dramatically worse in presence of a strong “financial” channel, i.e. when financial 
operators overreact to changes in public deficits (ϕb >> 0); improvements in public balance are 
over-dependent on changes in economic activity (((1 – tw)(bu/α) + b)/χ >> 0); austerity measures are 
even slightly contractionary on the onset. In such a context, the RHS of equation 1 in system (S.1) 
gets steeper than the LHS (see Figure 2). Correspondingly, the denominator in equation (20) turns 
out to be negative, and short-run Keynesian instable emerges. No short-run equilibrium exists. 
Despite discretionary budget cuts could per se reduce the public deficit, even a subsequent small 
economic contraction can eventually make public disarrays larger. Financial panic erupts due to 
worsening public finance conditions. Interest rates skyrocket. Economic recession gets deeper and 
gives rise to an endless “race to the bottom”, which will inevitably end up in a public debt default 
and a tremendously painful economic dislocation (see endless right-to-left movement in Figure 2). 
This kind of dynamics sadly resembles that one observed in Greece since 2010. Eventually, the 
results of fiscal cuts could be opposite than those expected by EAT supporters even when the 
“financial” channel significantly affects macroeconomic real and financial variables.  
 
[Figure 2 here] 
     
3. Last but not least, after 2012, the monetary scenario prevailing in the eurozone resembles more 
closely that one characterizing the US since the outbreak of the worldwide financial crisis. Indeed, 
thanks to Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” pledge to save the euro, financial speculation on 
peripheral countries’ government bonds has calmed down, and interest rates id have decreased 
significantly. In such a context, it makes sense to question the effectiveness of the “financial” 
channel through which fiscal austerity is expected to positively contribute to economic recovery. As 
Roberto Perotti himself stresses, “if fiscal consolidations were expansionary in the past because 
they caused a steep decline in interest rates or inflation, it is unlikely that the same mechanism can 
be relied on in the present circumstances, with low inflation and interest rates close to zero (Perotti, 
2012, p.309)”. 
     
3.2 The short-run macroeconomic effects of lower unemployment benefits 
An additional proposition of the EAT is that well-designed austerity packages should also encompass 
cuts in public wages, reduction in public employment, and cuts in unemployment benefits bu in order 
to establish a climate of wage rate moderation (i.e. a lower nominal wage rate w), and to improve the 
external competitiveness of the economy. In our model, system (S.2) formalizes the short-run effects 
of a reduction in unemployment benefits bu: 
  
(S.2)
𝑑𝜒 = =4 =4 (f/8) =4r J ¦E/¦QR r yQRN J ¦q/¦E ¦E/¦QR yQR¡ 4 =4 =4 J =J ¡ yQf4 =4 =4  E4QR J𝑑𝑏 = =4 =4r8r 𝑑𝑏@ − (=4) QR/8r + Qr 𝑑𝜒  
 
with 𝜕𝑤/𝜕𝑏@ > 0; 𝜕𝑞/𝜕𝑤 < 0; 𝑑𝑏@ < 0. 
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Equations (22) and (23) give the solutions of system (S.2):  
 
(22) 𝑑𝜒 § = =4 =4 (f/8) =4r J ¦E/¦QR r J ¦q/¦E ¦E/¦QR 4 =4 =4 J =J 𝜙𝑏 ON ON? yQRf4 =4 =4  E4QR J 4 =4 =4 J =J  (ON) R/ J  
 
 
(23) 𝑑𝑏 § = =4 =4r8r 𝑑𝑏@ − (=4) QR/8r + Qr 𝑑𝜒 § 
 
Once again, no clear-cut solutions exist, and the theoretical basis of the EAT appears as extremely 
weak. In particular, the direct effect of a cut in unemployment benefits is a lower demand injection in 
the form of lower consumption expenditures. This would certainly deepen recession instead of 
prompting recovery. The contraction in the domestic component of aggregate demand might be 
compensated by an increasing external demand for homemade goods that might emerge in presence of 
lower domestic nominal wages w and, thus, of a depreciated real exchange rate q. However, increasing 
net exports and, possibly, booming economic activity, strongly rely upon the sensitiveness of net 
exports to the real exchange rate (i.e. parameter 𝜖q in equation (22)), which in turn depends on to the 
sectorial composition of net exports themselves and to the degree of openness of the economy (see 
Taylor, 1991). It is perhaps not by chance that one of the most cited examples of successful 
expansionary austerity is that one taking place in Ireland in late 1980s. Ireland is a small open 
economy that is highly integrated on international goods markets, and that exports a restricted but 
highly dynamic variety of manufactured products (pharmaceutical products, for instance). At the end 
of the 1980s Irish exports were already accounting for more than 50 percent of Irish GDP. Perotti 
(2012) himself recognizes that a fundamental pillar of late 1980s Irish economic rebound was the solid 
expansion of Irish exports due to domestic wage moderation and fast reduction in inflation plus the 
initial one-shot devaluation of the Irish pound, and the economic expansion of Britain, i.e. Ireland’s 
most important trade partner. Now: part of the above policy recipe, i.e. the devaluation of the domestic 
currency, is not available in eurozone countries any longer. Second, it is questionable that a small 
peripheral eurozone country like Greece could currently follow that same development pattern. Indeed, 
Greece is a small, relatively closed and largely de-industrialized economy. Accordingly, there are 
reasonable doubts that the emphasis on internal devaluation as sponsored by the EAT supporters would 
currently give rise in Greece to the same results as wage moderation supposedly did in Ireland when 
combined with other no-more available policy options, and when applied in a much more favorable 
worldwide economic scenario. 
 
3. An empirical analysis of the foundations of the EAT. 
 
In this section, we econometrically test the validity of the mechanisms through which EAT supporters 
claim well-designed austerity measures might deliver expansionary outcomes. We also test how the 
degree of monetary sovereignty characterizing an economy may affect the operativeness of EAT 
mechanisms, the “financial” channel first and foremost. 
We collected a sample of 28 developed economies, which corresponds to an unbalanced panel 
dataset of 216 annual observations (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). We include both monetarily 
sovereign and non-monetarily sovereign (read eurozone) countries. We consider annual data from 
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2007 to 2016 in order to understand how austerity measures implemented in the aftermath of the 
worldwide financial crisis have worked.  
After having ruled out the estimation of a random effect model through a Hausman test, we opted 
for a fixed effect model. The fixed effect model controls for unobserved time-invariant effects, and 
produces unbiased estimates under the assumption of strict exogeneity of independent variables (i.e. 
explanatory variables uncorrelated with idiosyncratic errors ɛit in each time period). This could be quite 
a strong assumption. Indeed, fiscal and monetary policy variables might be interpreted as weakly 
endogenous responses to the evolution of the economic cycle. This fact notwithstanding, after 2009, 
the spread of the “austerity mantra” has turned fiscal consolidation into something similar to a strictly 
exogenous policy stance to pursue regardless the specific state of the economy. Even the extreme 
actions taken by ECB president Draghi in 2012 in response to financial turbulences have all the 
characteristics of purely discretionary (therefore exogenous) policy choices, which could not be taken 
for granted at all.  In addition to the above, the nature of our analysis, as well as the correspondent 
limited data availability, does not allow us to adopt more sophisticated modeling strategies that control 
for various degrees of endogeneity (e.g. IV estimators, GMM, etc.). Last but not least, our fixed effect 
model precisely follows the same approach used by most previous empirical investigations about the 
relationship between austerity policies and macro-financial variables (see, for example, Giavazzi et al., 
2005, as well as De Grauwe and Ji, 2013).  
The structure of the relationship between the error term and the explanatory variables in a fixed 
effect model does not allow for the inclusion of time-constant variables. Actually, these variables are 
important in our analysis since we are interested in analyzing the role of institutional differences (i.e. 
monetary sovereign countries vs. non-monetarily sovereign ones) in shaping the effectiveness of 
macroeconomic policies. The most consistent way to overcome this issue is to interact time constant 
variables with relevant time-variant ones. This modality is superior to different estimations carried out 
on different samples split in accordance to the institutional factor at stake. When employing a fixed 
effect model, the choice of the goodness-of-fit measure is not straightforward. We follow the standard 
approach, and we choose the within-R2 measure, i.e. the amount of time variation in the dependent 
variable explained by the time variation in the explanatory variables. 
We test the validity of our specifications using two standard tests. First, we test for the existence of 
unit-roots using both Fisher and Levin-Lin-Chu approaches (see Table A.2). Second, we assess the 
biasing presence of cross sectional dependence with Pesaran test, which also informed the 
inclusion/exclusion of time dummies in the various estimations (see Table A.3). All these tests support 
both our choices of specifications and the soundness of the estimations.  
We investigate the econometric solidity of the EAT through a set of six equations. Equations (24) 
and (25) test the main mechanisms at the basis of the “financial” channel.  
 
(24) 𝑖y = 𝑎=∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 + 𝑎§∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵«  + 𝑎¬ ­, + 𝑎® ­, «  + 𝑎¯𝐶𝐶𝐴+𝑎°𝐶𝐶𝐴«  + 𝑎± ­, «­²³^Ai +𝑎´𝑔¶ + 𝜀¶,= 
 
(25) 𝑖bc = 𝑏=𝑖y + 𝑏§∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 + 𝑏¬∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵«  + 𝑏®𝑔 + 𝑏¯𝑖e{ + 𝜀¶,§ 
 
In equation (24), we explain how interest rates on 10-year government bonds (id) are determined. We 
take yearly changes in the CAPB (ΔCAPB), i.e. the standard measure of discretionary fiscal policy in 
the EAT literature, as first relevant explicative variable. According to equation (17), we also check for 
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the relevance of public finance variables. In order to avoid multicollinearity issues with respect to 
changes in the CAPB, we use the debt-to-GDP ratio (D/Y) rather than the deficit-to-GDP ratio. Indeed, 
this is consistent with financial operators’ common practices, which take the debt-to-GDP ratio as a 
leading indicator of public finance solidity. Beyond these variables, we consider the cumulative 
current account balance (CCA) from 2007 on as third factor influencing interest rates’ determination. 
Following De Grauwe and Ji (2013), the CCA is a proxy for the international financial position 
characterizing an economy over the relevant time spell. A positive (and increasing) CCA is associated 
to countries that are creditors on international financial markets, i.e. Germany, Japan, and the other 
core eurozone countries. An increasingly negative CCA characterizes debtor monetary sovereign 
countries such as the USA and the UK, which have been able to continuously attract foreign capitals 
even after the 2007-2008 financial shock. A negative but decreasing (or stabilizing) net international 
investment position is associated to peripheral eurozone economies. In our regression, the CCA is 
meant to capture the important role that net creditor/debtor positions on international financial markets 
may have plaid in determining diverging dynamics of sovereign bonds yields in central and peripheral 
eurozone countries since 2008. According to the specification of equation (17) in our theoretical 
model, all the above variables are interacted with a dummy variable dMS (see variables with subscript 
MS) in order to capture how monetary sovereignty may influence the functioning of the “financial” 
channel. This dummy variable takes value 1 if country “i” is monetarily sovereign, whilst takes value 0 
if non-monetarily sovereign.  
In the same vein, we introduce a “Mario Draghi” dummy (specific to eurozone countries) in 
equation (24), i.e. (D/Y)MDRAGHI, in order to further assess the effects of the ECB president’s “whatever 
in takes” statement on the determination of government bonds’ yields in the eurozone after 2012.  
Finally, the growth rate of the economy (gi) is a control variable for the effects that a growing and 
expanding economy may have on government bonds’ interest rates. 
In line with equation (16), equation (25) tests the relationship between the lending rate on loans to 
the private sector (icr) and the interest rate on government bonds (id). Also, we check for any possible 
direct effect austerity measures may have on the costs of external financing. We run this analysis 
taking into account the specific monetary environment in which austerity measures are implemented. 
In equation (25), we detect the effects of the growth rate of the economy (gi) on the lending rate, as 
well as the effects of the monetary policy stance adopted by the central banks as captured by the 
central bank policy rate (iCB). 
Equations (26) and (27) focus on the “external” channel: 
 
(26) (=q) = 	 𝑐=∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 + 𝑐§𝐶𝐶𝐴 + 𝑐¬𝐶𝐶𝐴«  + 𝑐®𝑖e{ + 𝜀¶,¬  
 
(27) 𝑔¹o = ℎ=𝑔q + ℎ§𝑔²º + 𝜀¶,® 
 
Equation (26) analyses the determinants of the inverse of real exchange rate (q)7. We investigate 
whether austerity measures effectively triggered off a devaluation of the real exchange rate (i.e. a 
reduction of 1/q), this way improving the external competitiveness of the economy. We also estimate 
the extent to which the real exchange rate is related to the net international investment position 
characterizing monetarily sovereign and non-monetarily sovereign countries (see CCA and CCAMS in 
equation (26)), as well as the monetary policy stance by the central bank (iCB).  
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Equation (27) aims at assessing for the relevance of changes in the real effective exchange rate (gq) 
and in the growth rate of the rest of the world gRW (with respect to any single economy included in our 
sample) on export dynamics (gEX). We take the percentage variation of exports as dependent variable 
in order to avoid any autocorrelation problem. 
Equations (28) and (29) test for the “expectation” channel, and the effects austerity may display on 
private consumption, and gross fixed capital formation:        
 
(28) 𝑔e = 𝑗=∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 + 𝑗§∆𝑊𝑆 + 𝜀¶,¯ 
 
(29) 𝑔i = 𝑧=∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 + 𝑧§𝑖𝑐𝑟 + 𝑧¬𝑔¶ + 𝑧®∆𝑊𝑆 + 𝜀¶,° 
 
In equation (28), percentage changes in private consumptions (with respect to GDP) are explained as a 
function of discretionary fiscal policies (ΔCAPB), and of changes in the adjusted wage share (ΔWS) on 
domestic income. On the one hand, the former estimates the direct “expectation” channel through 
which austerity measures might influence private consumptions. On the other hand, EAT supporters 
claim that well-designed fiscal packages should expressly aim at inducing an internal devaluation by 
establishing a climate of wage moderation and by causing a sort of wage (share) suppression. There is 
an increasing empirical evidence stressing the “perverse” distributional consequences of austerity 
measures on the wage share and, therefore, on consumption expenditures (see Ball et al., 2013). The 
inclusion of the latter term in regression (28) aims at capturing the indirect effects that restrictive fiscal 
policies may have on domestic private consumptions by affecting functional income distribution.  
Equation (29) verifies the relevance of (restrictive) discretionary fiscal policies in affecting 
entrepreneurs’ expectations, their investment plans, and hence the growth rate of the available capital 
stock (gI). Consistently with the theoretical specification of the investment function contained in our 
theoretical model (see equation (11)), we include as additional explicative variables the lending rate on 
private loans (icr), the change in the adjusted wage share (ΔWS), and the growth rate of the economy 
(gi). The inclusion of ΔWS in equation (29) is meant to verify the sensitivity of private investments to 
the profit share. The growth rate of the economy represents a proxy for the evolution of capacity 
utilization. Accordingly, parameter z3 estimates the well-known “accelerator” term characterizing 
standard post-Keynesian investment functions. 
Similarly to the case of exports, also in equations (28) and (29) we take percentage variations (log-
differences) in aggregate private consumptions and gross fixed capital formation in order to rule out 
any unit root problem.   
Overall, the results of our empirical exercise tell us that, from 2007 to 2016, austerity measures did 
not deliver the expected results. Most of the time, their effects were contrary to EAT’s hypotheses. 
Such empirical evidence fully endorses our search for a more general model, in which economic 
expansion is just one perhaps remotely possible consequence of austerity measures amongst many 
other far less favorable outcomes. More in details, Table 1 shows our findings as to equations (24) – 
(26). In Table 1, we provide the results related to two different specifications of equations (25) and 
(26). The distinguishing element between equations (25) and (25b) is the inclusion in the latter of the 
central banks monetary policy rate iCB as additional explicative variable. In equation (26b), we drop the 
growth rate of the rest of the world from the set of variables describing the evolution of the real 
effective exchange rate. 
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[Table 1 here] 
 
Our empirical evidence on the determinants of 10-year government bonds’ yields largely confirms 
the validity of the theoretical assumptions encapsulated in equation (17). First, the debt-to-GDP ratio 
(D/Y) turns out to be significant to explain id in the context of non-monetarily sovereign countries. As 
expected, the sign of the relationship between (D/Y) and id is positive. In non-monetarily sovereign 
countries, the higher the debt-to-GDP ratio, the higher the yields eurozone governments will 
remunerate to financial investors as a compensation for an allegedly higher creditor risk. However, 
such a relationship turns out to be extremely weak and almost irrelevant in the context of monetarily 
sovereign economies (i.e. a3 + a4 = 0.0439 – 0.0365 = 0.0074). In line with De Grauwe and Ji (2013), 
in monetarily sovereign economies financial operators seem not to consider the most common fiscal 
balance ratios as relevant indicators for the solidity of the public balance itself.  
The same line of reasoning applies to the CCA. In the case of non-monetarily sovereign countries, 
the accumulation of a positive net investment position on international financial markets contributes to 
drive down interest rates on domestic public bonds. Vice versa, net debtor economies will have to pay 
higher and increasing interest rates on their own public bonds. This factor may explain the widening 
spread between central and peripheral eurozone country government bonds’ yields in the aftermath of 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Following Merler and Pisany-Ferry (2012), yields initially shoot up in 
some peripheral eurozone countries as a consequence of their exposure to capital outflows rather than 
due to the fragility of their public accounts. The relationship between CCA and id remains negative 
even in the context of monetarily sovereign countries. Nevertheless, it becomes significantly weaker 
and negligible (a5 + a6 = -0,0097). This finding strengthens the idea that public bonds issued by 
monetarily sovereign governments are always appealing to the eyes of financial operators, in particular 
when financial turbulences mounts, no matter how high is the debt-to-GDP ratio or the external debt. 
The empirical analysis of the direct effects of austerity policies on government bonds’ yields largely 
support our critique to the EAT. In non-monetarily sovereign countries, a positive rather than negative 
link emerges. From 2007 to 2016, austerity measures drown up rather than down government bonds’ 
interest rates in (peripheral) eurozone economies. On the one hand, these findings confirm the results 
by Born et al. (2014) as to the initial counter-intuitive effects (with respect to EAT postulates) of 
austerity measures on interest rates in contexts of “fiscal stress” (i.e. the prevailing condition in several 
eurozone countries in the aftermath of the crisis). On the other hand, our findings suggest that austerity 
measures could effectively trigger off a perverse “financial” channel in the context of non-monetarily 
sovereign countries (see figures 1 and 2). Fiscal contractions that curtail growth and increase the debt 
(deficit)-to-GDP ratio eventually raise rather than reduce public bonds’ interest rates. In the case of 
monetarily sovereign countries, the relationship between id and ΔCAPB gets negative (a1 + a2 = -
0,1416), in line with the prediction of the EAT supporters. This result seems at odds with the above 
findings on the insignificant relationships between id and (D/Y) and CCA. A possible explanation for 
this apparent paradox relies upon the “risk-free” status usually attached to public bonds issued by 
monetarily sovereign countries, rather than on the virtues of fiscal austerity per se. In the aftermath of 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis, all financial operators were reshuffling their financial positions away 
from “private” assets towards public bonds issued by monetarily sovereign countries. Their demand 
increased considerably, no matter how was the effective solidity of governmental finances (De 
Grauwe, 2011). In this context, austerity measures widened even further such a “notional” excess 
demand for “monetarily sovereign” public bonds by squeezing public deficits and reducing the supply 
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of new government bonds. Accordingly, the public bonds’ yields decreased. Nonetheless, this event is 
ultimately due to the natural properties of public bonds issued by governments that cannot practically 
go bankruptcy (Kregel, 2012), rather than to the effects fiscal retrenchments might possibly have on 
public budget’s soundness. 
Interestingly, as partial confirmation of our previous argument, it is worth stressing that the 
coefficient associated to the “Mario Draghi” dummy variable is significant and negative (a7 = -
0.0209). Our empirical evidence suggests that, after 2012, Draghi’s intervention has been effective in 
reducing pressures on the interest rates on bonds issued by peripheral eurozone governments. This 
significantly contributed to the creation of a “monetary environment” more akin to the one 
characterizing monetarily sovereign countries, this way striking financial speculation on peripheral 
countries government bonds.   
Last but not least, the level of interest rates on government bonds is negatively affected by the 
overall economic growth of the economy (a8 = - 5.6389). This result reinforces the idea that economic 
growth, and not austerity, is the most important stabilizer of public finances.  
Estimations associated to equation (25) confirm that government bonds’ yields influence in a 
significantly positive way the interest rates on private loans. The latter also tend to increase in a 
growing economy (see the statistically positive relationship between icr and gi), very likely as a 
consequence of an increasing demand for loans. The direct effect of fiscal restrictions on icr is 
negative, as EAT supporters would suggest. In this regards, two points are worth stressing. First, the 
distinction between non-monetarily sovereign and monetarily sovereign economies seems to be 
statistically irrelevant as far as icr is concerned (see the statistically insignificant dummy variable 
ΔCAPBMS in equations (25) and (25b)). Secondly, and more relevantly, the direct effect of austerity 
measures is considerably downsized when we introduce iCB as additional explicative variable in 
equation (25b). Indeed, iCB displays a strong and positive effect on icr (i.e. the more expansionary is 
monetary policy, the lower is the lending rate on loans to the private sector). Simultaneously, the 
coefficient linked to discretionary fiscal policy shrinks from -0.2379 in equation (25) to -0.0769 in 
equation (25b). Accordingly, whilst the direct effect of an improvement in the CAPB on icr remains 
slightly negative, its overall effect (should we also include the indirect effect changes in the CAPB 
may cause on icr via id) turns out to be small and positive in the case of non-monetarily sovereign 
economies y¶½y∆e³¾{ = ¦¶½¦∆e³¾{ + ¦¶½¦¶¿ ¦¶¿¦∆e³¾{ = -0.0769 + 0.2818*0.3634 = 0.026. 
The explicative power of the equations (26) and (26b) is extremely limited8. Austerity measures 
seem not to play any statistically relevant effect on the real exchange rate (q), differently from what 
expected by the advocates of the EAT and, more generally, by most open-economy mainstream 
models. If any, such an effect has the unexpected sign. Fiscal austerity seems to cause an appreciation 
of the real exchange rate (i.e. an increase of 1/q, and a reduction of q), rather than a devaluation. At the 
end of the day, the central bank policy rate iCB is the only significant explicative variable entering 
equation (26b) with the expected positive sign. 
Table 2 enters into the details of the effects austerity policies have displayed on the main 
components of GDP from 2007 to 2016. Austerity measures do not play any direct statistically relevant 
role in determining the dynamics of private consumptions and export flows. If any, such a direct effect 
is negative and contrary to what expected by EAT supporters. In the case of exports, the above direct 
negative (although insignificant) effect is even magnified by the perverse indirect one passing through 
the appreciation of the real exchange rate. Actually, q is the only significant variable affecting export 
dynamics with the expected negative sign. As expected, private consumptions respond positively to 
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increases in the wage share. Consistently with Ball et al. (2013), an austerity-led reduction in the wage 
share will drain even further the most relevant component of domestic effective demand. 
Evidence about austerity’s effects on private investments is slightly more controversial. First, 
austerity measures seem to play a very limited positive direct effect (z1 = 0.0086) on private 
investments. This fact notwithstanding, in the case of non-monetarily sovereign countries, fiscal 
austerity can eventually curtail rather than stimulate private investments through three additional 
pernicious “indirect” channels: (1) the increase of the leading rate icr on loans to the private sector 
(which has, as expected, a significantly negative effects on private investments z2 = -0.0240); (2) the 
possible slowdown in overall economic growth, which positively influences investment through the 
accelerator (z3 = 2.5334); (3) the reduction through time of the wage share, given the apparently wage-
led nature of investment decisions in the economies under observations in the last decade (i.e. z4 = 
0.0104). In the case of monetarily sovereign countries, the fact that austerity policies may contribute to 
reduce the interest rates on private loans (via their effect on id) may surely help to revive private 
investments. Yet, the concerns about the indirect contractionary effects austerity may trigger off by 
hampering overall growth dynamics, and by squeezing the wage share are still valid. These concerns 
go hand-in-hand with our previous emphasis on the fact that austerity measures are, in general, hardly 
effective by themselves (see the evidence about non-monetarily sovereign countries). Indeed, it seems 
to be far more important to create a much safer “monetary environment”, which stabilizes public 
finances and makes government bonds’ “risk-free” by default.                                         
 
4. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we develop a comprehensive critique of the expansionary austerity theory (EAT). Our 
critique is moved both from the theoretical and empirical terrains.  
We first present a short-run model, which plays on the same ground of the EAT by allowing for some 
of its crucial assumptions and mechanisms, and by carefully formalizing the components of a 
supposedly well-designed austerity package.  
Even admitting for these EAT-like features, austerity-led short-run expansions still remain highly 
uncertain events that could theoretically take place only under unrealistic and perhaps heroic 
circumstances (expanding private consumptions even tough permanent cuts in public transfers in the 
present and uncertain tax reductions in the future). 
In the second part of the paper, we econometrically test the empirical solidity of the EAT building 
blocks. Table 3 provides a summative comparison between the main outcomes of the EAT, the wider 
range of results our theoretical model allows for, and the empirical findings of our econometric 
analysis.  
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Our empirical evidence reinforces our theoretical doubts. Since 2007, austerity did not stabilize at 
all public finances in non-monetarily sovereign countries. Rather, it may have triggered off a perverse 
“financial” channel, in which hiking interest rates have fed back in widening public balance disarrays. 
In monetarily sovereign countries, the “safe haven” status traditionally attached to their own public 
bonds in time of financial turmoil may have been far more important than austerity per se in order to 
make public finances solid. Even further, the “external” and “expectation” channels seem not to have 
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been operative, or they operated in the opposite direction with respect to what EAT supporters usually 
claim. 
In the end, our analysis suggests that EAT policy prescriptions should be taken as purely theoretical 
speculations relying on unrealistic assumptions and without strong empirical ground. Our findings 
suggest that EAT cannot provide any solid guideline for the conduction of fiscal policies aimed at 
obtaining positive society-wide objectives.     
 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. See Sutherland (1997) for the case of possible non-Keynesian effects of expansionary fiscal measures when undertaken 
in a context of high public debt. Perotti (2012) stresses that fiscal contractions may be expansionary in presence of high 
interest rates, in particular when they contribute to reduce risk premiums on financial assets, on government bonds first of 
all, and prompt a considerable reduction in nominal interest rates. 
 
2. Alesina and Ardagna (2010) argue that lower public sector employment, lower public sector wages, and (or) lower 
degrees of labor market protection (say cut in unemployment benefits), tend to increase individual labor supply and reduce 
trade unions’ bargaining power. It is easy to see how these effects of fiscal adjustments may stimulate growth in supply-
side mainstream models.  
 
3. The same logic may apply in presence of a reduction of public benefits to unemployed people that perhaps makes 
average expected income lower. 
 
4. Indeed, assuming id to positively depend on the public debt-to-GDP ratio, instead of (or jointly with) the deficit-to-GDP, 
would have not changed the logic of the model. Rather, it would have made the model even more sensitive to any austerity-
led contraction in economic activity (hence increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio). The perverse consequences of austerity 
packages would have emerged even more easily. 
 
5. De Grauwe and Ji (2013) explicitly state that “ [in the case of “stand-alone” economies] financial markets do not seem to 
be concerned with the size of the government debt and of the fiscal space […] despite the fact that the variation of these 
ratios is of a similar order of magnitude as the one observed in the Eurozone (De Grauwe and Ji, 2013, p. 24)”. 
 
6. Ali Abbas et al. (2013) note that “front-loaded consolidations have tended to increase public debt in the short run […] 
Empirically, fiscal effort has been more likely to reduce public debt when growth has been stronger [whilst] the debt-to-
GDP ratio increases in the short run when fiscal consolidations come at the cost of lower economic activity. [In the end] 
while credibility effects can ease the pain of fiscal adjustment through lower risk premiums, this is unlikely to fully offset 
the short-run adverse impact on economic activity (Ali Abbas et al., 2013, p. 3)”. 
 
7. In regression (26), we use (1/q) rather than q as dependent variable in order to be consistent with IMF data on the real 
effective exchange rate (REER), which are computed as the inverse of the theoretical formulation we adopt in equation (7). 
Accordingly, a depreciation (appreciation) of real exchange rate, i.e. a reduction (increase) in IMF’s REER, corresponds to 
a decreasing (increasing) 1/q ratio (i.e. a raise (reduction) in q). 
 
8. The goodness-of-fit measures of the various econometric specifications we adopt are not very large. This is partially due 
to the inclusion in our dataset of the years in the immediate aftermath of the worldwide financial crisis, in which variability 
in the main macroeconomic variables has been considerable. As stressed in the main text, the within-R2 assesses the 
effectiveness of our model in explaining the relationships between the variability of dependent and explanatory variables. 
We think that the within-R2 associated to our regressions are reasonably high if we take into account the abovementioned 
high variability characterizing our time spell.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 	
References 
 
Alesina A. (2010) – Fiscal adjustments: lessons from recent history, paper prepared for the EU Ecofin 
meeting in Madrid, April 15th 2010.  
Alesina A., and Perotti R. (1997) – Fiscal Adjustments in OECD Countries: Composition and 
Macroeconomic Effects, IMF Staff Papers, vol.44 (2), pp. 210 – 248. 
Alesina A., and Ardagna S. (2010) – Large Changes in Fiscal Policy: Tax versus Spending, in J.R. 
Brown (ed.), Tax Policy and the Economy, pp. 35 - 68. 
Alesina A., and Ardagna S. (2012) – The Design of Fiscal Adjustments, NBER Working Paper n. 
18423. 
Alesina, A., C. Favero, and F. Giavazzi (2015) – The Output Effects of Fiscal Consolidation Plans, 
Journal of International Economics vol.96(supplement 1): S19 – S42. 
Ali Abbas A., Akitoby B., Andritzki J., Berger H., Komatsuzaki T., and Taylor J. (2013) – Dealing 
with High Debt in a Era of Low Growth, IMF Staff Discussion Note 13/07. 
Auerbach A., and Gorodnichenko Y. (2012) –  Measuring the Output Responses to Fiscal Policy, 
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, vol.4 (2), pp. 1 – 27.  
Baker D., and Rosnick D. (2014) – Stimulus and fiscal consolidation: The evidence and implications, 
IMK Working Paper n.135. 
Ball, L., Furceri, D., Leigh, D., and Loungani P. (2013) – The distributional effects of fiscal 
consolidation, IMF Working Paper n. 13/151.  
Bhaduri A., and Marglin S. (1990), Unemployment and the Real Wage: The Economic Basis for 
Contesting Political Ideology, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol.14 (4), pp. 375 – 393. 
Boyer R. (2012) - The four fallacies of contemporary austerity policies: the lost Keynesian legacy”, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol.36 (1), pp. 283- 312. 
Born, B., Muller, G.J., and Pfeifer, J. (2014) – Does austerity pay off?, SAFE working paper series 
n.77. 
De Grauwe P., (2011) – Managing a Fragile Eurozone, Cesifo Forum n. 2/2011.  
De Grauwe P., and Ji Y. (2013) – Self-fulfilling Crises in the Eurozone: An Empirical Test, Journal of 
International Money and Finance, vol.34, pp. 15 – 36. 
Foresti P., and Marani U. (2014) – Expansionary fiscal consolidations: Theoretical underpinnings and 
their implications for the eurozone, Contributions to Political Economy, vol.33 (1), pp. 19 – 33.  
Giavazzi F., and Pagano M. (1990) – Can Severe Fiscal Contractions Be Expansionary? Tales of two 
Small European Countries, NBER Macroeconomic Annual, vol.5, pp. 75 – 122. 
Giavazzi F., and Pagano M. (1996) – Non-Keynesian Effects of Fiscal Policy Changes: International 
Evidence and the Swedish Experience, Swedish Economic Policy review, vol.39 (3), pp. 635 – 657. 
Giavazzi, F., Jappelli T., and Pagano M. (2005) – Searching for non-monotonic effects of fiscal policy: 
New evidence, Monetary and Economic Studies, vol.23 (S1), pp. 197 – 217.  
Guajardo J., D. Leigh, and Pescatori A. (2011) – Expansionary Austerity: New Empirical Evidence, 
IMF Working Paper n. 158. 
Kregel J., (2012) – Six Lessons from the Euro Crisis, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Policy 
Note n. 2012/10  
Lavoie M. (2015) – Post-Keynesian Economics: New Foundations, Cheltenham (UK) and 
Northampton (USA): Edward Elgar. 
23 	
Mehrling P. (2011) – The New Lombard Street. How the Fed Became a Dealer of Last Resort. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Merler S., and Pisani-Ferry J. (2012) – Sudden Stops in the euro area, Review of Economics and 
Institutions, vol.3 (3), pp. 1 – 23. 
Palley T. (2010) – The Simple Macroeconomics of Fiscal Austerity, Public Sector Debt and Deflation, 
IMK Working Paper n. 8/2010. 
Perotti R. (2012) – The “Austerity Myth”: Gain without Pain?, in A. Alesina, and F. Giavazzi (eds.), 
Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis, University of Chicago Press, pp. 307 – 354. 
Qazizada W., and Stockhammer E. (2015) – Government spending multipliers in contractions and 
expansions, International Review of Applied Economics, vol.29 (2), pp. 238 – 258. 
Sutherland A. (1997) – Fiscal Crises and Aggregate Demand: Can High Public Debt Reverse the 
Effect of Fiscal Policy?, Journal of Public Economics, vol.65 (2), pp. 147 – 162. 
Taylor L. (1991) – Income Distribution, Inflation and Growth: Lectures on Structuralist 
Macroeconomic Theory, MIT Press: Cambridge (USA) and London (UK), ch. 7, pp. 143 – 150. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 	
Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1 – Austerity-led economic contraction and rising deficit-to-GDP ratios. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Austerity-led “endless” economic contraction and explosive deficit-to-GDP (and debt-to-
GDP) ratios in an unstable short-run setting. 
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Table 1 – Estimation results for interest rates and the real exchange rate, 2007 – 2016. 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑖y	 24 	 𝑖bc	 25 	 	𝑖𝑐𝑟	 25𝑏  1/𝑞	(26) 1/𝑞	(26b) ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 0.3634*** (0.1017) -0.2379*** (0.1272) -0.0768*** (0.0269) 0.4994* (0.2726) 0.4154 (0.2852) ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵«  -0.5050*** (0.1235) -0.2133 (0.2609) -0.3405 (0.2658)   𝑔¶ -5.6389* (3.0776) 5.5091*** (1.8025) 3.2727** (1.4823)   𝐷𝑌  0.0439*** (0.0065)     𝐷𝑌 «  -0.0365** (0.0177)     𝐷𝑌 «­²³^Ai -0.0209*** (0.0052)     𝐶𝐶𝐴 -0.0500* (0.0269)   0.0329 (0. 0652) 0.0339 (0.0666) 𝐶𝐶𝐴« 	 0.0403* (0.0231)   0.0483 (0. 1309) 0.1165 (0.1370) 𝑖y  0.3541*** (0.1272) 0.2818*** (0.0625)   𝑖e{   0.4421*** (0.1038) 1.9354*** (0.5224) 1.7494*** (0.5594) 𝑔²º    -0.1585 (0.986)  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 Yes  No  No No No 𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 − 𝑅§ 0.6620   0.3987 0.4917 0.2474 0.1742 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓	𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 216 216 216 211 211 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑	𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑎= +𝑎§ = 0	(𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)  0.0026     𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑	𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑎¬ + 𝑎®= 0	(𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) 0.0032     𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑	𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑎¯ +𝑎° = 0	(𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)  
 
0.1277     𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑	𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑏§ + 𝑏¬= 0	(𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)  0.0000 0.0001   𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑	𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝛽¬ +𝛽¬.= = 0	(𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)  
 
     𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑	𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑐§ + 𝑐¬ =0	(𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)  
 
   0.2216 0.2272 
Clustered at country level and robust standard errors are shown in brackets. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. The 
coefficients for year dummies are omitted.  
Note: in equations (25b), (26), and (26b), iCB is not available for Japan and Iceland. We use the money market 
interest rate as a proxy. We tested the robustness of our results by excluding these two countries from our sample in 
regressions (25c) and (26c) – see Table A.4 in the Appendix.  
We checked and confirmed the robustness of our results in estimations (26) and (26b) by dropping the insignificant 
effect of CCA – see Table A.4 in the Appendix.  
In equations (26) and (26b), Slovenia is excluded from these estimations since that the real effective exchange rate 
was not available. 
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Table 2 – Estimation results for main GDP components other than public consumptions and imports, 
2007-2016 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔¹	(27) 𝑔e	(28) 𝑔i(29) ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 -0.0036 (.0026) - 0.0006  (0.0008)  0.0086** (0.0031) 
 𝑔q -0.4131** (0. 1841)   𝑔²º -.15323 (1.172)   𝑖bc   -0.0211*** (0.0055)  𝑔¶   2.5334*** (0.1756) ∆𝑊𝑆  0.0104*** (0.0023) 0.0169*** (0.0047) 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 Yes  No No  𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 − 𝑅§ 0.7067  0.5304 0.6496 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓	𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 216 216 216 
Clustered at country level and robust standard errors are shown in brackets. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Note: Equation (27b) checks and confirms the robustness of our estimations in equation (27) when drop the insignificant 
effect of the growth rate of GDP of the rest of the world.    
 
 
 
 
Table 3 – Summative comparison between EAT hypothesis, our theoretical model, and the connected 
econometric analysis 
 𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝑙𝑒𝑑	𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠	𝑜𝑛	𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡	𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠, 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙	𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒	𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝜕𝑖y𝜕∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 𝑑𝑖bc𝑑∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 𝜕(1 𝑞)𝜕∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 𝑑𝐼𝑑∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 𝜕𝐶𝜕∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 𝜕𝐸𝜕∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 = 𝜕𝐸𝜕(1 𝑞) 𝜕(1 𝑞)𝜕∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 𝐸𝐴𝑇 < 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 𝑂𝑢𝑟	𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙	𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 ⋚ 0 ⋚ 0 < 0 ⋚ 0 ⋚ 0 > 0 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡		𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑀𝑆	𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠	(2007 − 2016) > 0 > 0 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛.,> 0 ⋚ 0 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛. , < 0 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛. , < 0 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡		𝑀𝑆	𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠	(2007 − 2016)	 < 0 < 0 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛.,> 0 ⋚ 0 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛. , < 0 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛. , < 0 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1 Variables definitions, sources and composition of the sample 
Variable Definition Source 𝑖y Long-term interest rate on 10-year government bonds AMECO + OECD  𝑖bc Lending interest rate on loans to the private sector IMF Financial Statistics + ECB statistics 𝑖e{	 Central bank policy rate* IMF financial statistics 𝑞	 Real effective exchange rate IMF financial statistics 𝐶	 Private consumption expenditures at current prices AMECO 𝐼	 Gross fixed capital formation at current prices  AMECO 𝐸	 Export of goods and services at current prices AMECO 𝑌¶ 	 Gross Domestic Product at current prices  AMECO 𝑌²º	 Rest of the World Product at current prices 𝑌E − 𝑌¶ 𝑊𝑆	 Adjusted wage share  AMECO 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵	 Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance IMF Fiscal Monitor 𝐷/𝑌 Debt-to-GDP ratio IMF World Economic Outlook 𝐶𝐶𝐴 Cumulative current account 2007-2016  IMF World Economic Outlook 
Sample composition 
Non-monetarily 
sovereign 
countries  
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain 
 
Monetarily 
sovereign 
countries (MS) 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, Norway, 
New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA 
 
*We used money market interest rates for Japan and Iceland as a proxy for the central bank policy rate due to the lack of direct 
information on this last policy variable. 
 
 
Table A.2 – Unit root tests (𝐻Ó hypothesis: panel contains unit root) 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑟	𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡: 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐿𝐿𝐶	𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡: 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖y 0.0260 0.000* 𝑖bc 0.0000 0.0000 𝐷𝑌 0.0000 0.0000 𝐶𝐶𝐴 0.2350 0.0640 𝑔¶ 0.0000 0.0000 𝑔²º 0.0000 0.0000 ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 0.0000 0.0000 𝑖e{ 0.0000 0.0000 𝑞 0.0000 0.0000 𝑔q	 0.0000 0.0000 𝑔i 0.0000 0.0000 𝑔e 0.0000 0.0000 ∆𝑊𝑆 0.0000 0.0000 𝑔¹ 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table A.3 – Pesaran test for cross sectional independence  𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒	 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡	𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒	 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 (24)	 0.0001 0.9943 (25)	 1.0000  (25b)	 0.9932  (26)	 1.0000  (26b)	 1.0000  (27)	 0.9882  (28)	 1.0000  (29)	 0.0002 0.9566 
 
 	
 
 
Table A.4 – Estimation results for robustness tests, 2007-2016. 
  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 	𝑖bc	(25𝑐	) 1 𝑞 	(26c) 𝑔¹	(27𝑏) ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 -0.0729** (0.0254) 0.4237 (0.2658) -0.0022 (0.0028) ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵«  0.0297 (0.04346)      𝑔¶ 1.4929 (1.634)    𝑔²º  -0.5204 (8.056)  𝑖y 0.2480*** (0.0519)   𝑖e{ 0.4219***    (0.1026)      1.8378*** (0.4540)  𝑔q   -0.5211*** (0.1155) 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 No No  Yes 𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 − 𝑅§ 0.5562 0.2720 0.7262 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓	𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 190 
 
190 216 
Clustered at country level and robust standard errors are shown in brackets. *p <0.1, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01. The 
coefficients for year dummies are omitted. Regression (25c) excludes Japan and Iceland. 
 
